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I. INTRODUCTION
Reform of the U.S. corporate tax system is again on the agenda. Despite
important differences, many current proposals share two common goals: (1)
reducing the statutory corporate tax rate to improve U.S. “international
competitiveness” and (2) broadening the corporate tax base by reducing or
eliminating business expenditures to offset revenue losses.1 Given the
significance of the passthrough sector and the relationship between
individual and corporate taxes, however, such reforms need to be considered
within a broader context.2 Part II of this Article discusses the growing
* Karen C. Burke, Richard B. Stephens Professor, University of Florida Levin College of
Law, and Visiting Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I would like to thank my copanelists Steven Bank, Michael Schler, and Martin Sullivan, and participants at the Pepperdine Law
Review & Tax Analysts symposium Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration on January
18, 2013. This article is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the
Second Obama Administration symposium, co-sponsored by Tax Analysts.
1. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., TAX REFORM ACT OF 2011
(Discussion Draft 2011) (Camp proposal); WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREAS. REP., THE
PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM (2012) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK] (Obama
proposal); cf. Jane G. Gravelle, Does the Concept of Competitiveness Have Meaning in Formulating
Corporate Tax Policy?, 65 TAX L. REV. 323, 323 (2012) (characterizing “international
competitiveness” as “a concept that is almost always simply asserted and virtually nowhere
defined”).
2. See George A. Plesko & Erin E. Henry, Some Devilish Details of Corporate Tax Reform, 21
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 382, 383 (2012). See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 4298,
TAXING BUSINESSES THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX (2012) [hereinafter CBO, TAXING
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significance of the passthrough sector, which now accounts for roughly half
of net business income. Part III explores new incentives for retaining
corporate earnings and mischaracterizing labor income that would arise from
an increase in individual income tax rates coupled with a simultaneous
decrease in corporate tax rates, and considers the feasibility of measures to
curb such sheltering within corporations. Finally, Part IV urges Congress to
look beyond reducing business expenditures to expand the corporate tax
base and recommends consideration of an entity level tax on certain large
partnerships.
II. RISE OF PASSTHROUGHS
Prior to the 1986 Act, the two-tier corporate tax system often functioned
as “a shelter rather than a burden.”3 Even though corporate income was
taxed twice—once at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level—
the effective tax rate was often less than the highest statutory rate for
corporations (46%).4 Distributions qualifying for capital gain treatment bore
at most a 20% tax, which could be avoided entirely if the stock were held
until death.5 The 1986 Act largely eliminated the use of corporations as
shelters by setting the corporate tax rate (34%) higher than the individual
rate (28%) and taxing capital gains at the same rate as ordinary income.6
The increased relative burden of the corporate tax encouraged self-help
integration through the use of passthroughs, as well as the expansion of
publicly traded “master limited partnerships.”7 In 1987, Congress sought to
prevent further erosion of the corporate tax base by enacting § 7704, which
classifies a publicly traded partnership as a corporation, subject to a passive
income exception.8
Following the 1986 Act, individual income tax rates rose, narrowing the
differential between the corporate and individual rates and eventually
surpassing the corporate rate in 1993. In 2003, parity was established
between the maximum corporate and individual rates, and dividends were

BUSINESSES].
3. Peter C. Canellos, Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By Default?, in CORPORATE
TAX REFORM: A REPORT OF THE INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUBCHAPTER C 129, 135 (George
K. Yin & George Mundstock eds., 1988).
4. Id.
5. Thus, assuming a 20% capital gains rate, the maximum combined corporate and shareholder
tax burden (56.8%) was not significantly above the top personal income rate (50%). Id.
6. The 1986 Act also repealed the so-called General Utilities doctrine, which allowed
corporations to distribute appreciated property without recognition of corporate level gain. See Gen.
Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
7. See Canellos, supra note 3, at 136.
8. See I.R.C. § 7704(a), (d). Unless otherwise indicated, all I.R.C. citations refer to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through January 2, 2013.
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temporarily taxed at the same rate as long-term capital gain. The
shareholder level tax on distributions generally makes corporations less
attractive than passthroughs, which have become more widely available.9 In
1988, the Internal Revenue Service recognized that state-law limited-liability
companies (LLCs) could be classified as partnerships for tax purposes.10
The enactment of § 7704 helped to facilitate the check-the-box regulations,
finalized in 1997, which allow unincorporated private business firms to
freely elect corporate or partnership status.11 By eliminating the linkage
between organizational form and tax status, the check-the-box regulations
undermine the justification for multiple passthrough regimes.12
Passthroughs have clearly become the vehicle of choice for nonpublicly
traded businesses. Prior to 1986, partnerships were popular mainly as taxshelter vehicles because of the opportunity to pass through losses and credits
to passive investors. The 1986 limitations on passive losses temporarily
Now partnerships are
reduced the attractiveness of partnerships.13
increasingly used by profitable ventures, with their share of net business
income rising from 3% in 1980 to 21% in 2008.14 In part, this trend reflects
the increasing popularity of LLCs and other limited-liability entities taxed as
partnerships under the default classification rules. During this period, the
share of net income received by all passthroughs rose from 21% to 50%.15
Following the 1986 Act, commentators predicted the demise of S
corporations, which are simpler but less flexible than partnerships.
Nevertheless, these entities have proven enormously popular. Between 1980
and 2006, the percentage of businesses organized as S corporations tripled,
increasing from 4.2% to 12.6%.16 The growth of S corporations is partly

9. If dividends are taxed at 15%, the maximum combined corporate and shareholder tax burden
is 44.75%. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
10. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (1988).
11. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2012).
12. Nevertheless, simplification of the entity classification rules has no political constituency.
See Williard B. Taylor, “Blockers,” “Stoppers,” and the Entity Classification Rules, 64 TAX LAW.
1, 32 (2010) (noting that the major passthrough industries have lobbying agendas that are likely to
lead only to greater complexity).
13. See I.R.C. § 469.
14. See Jane G. Gravelle & Thomas L. Hungerford, Corporate Tax Reform: Should We Really
Believe the Research?, 121 TAX NOTES 419, 421 (2008).
15. Id. This figure includes sole proprietorships, partnerships, and S corporations. The rise of
passthroughs was also spurred by the shift to a service-based economy. See CBO, TAXING
BUSINESSES, supra note 2, at 10.
16. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40748, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONAL
CHOICES: TAXATION AND RESPONSES TO LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 12 (2009). Between 1980 and
2008, the percentage of businesses (including sole proprietorships) organized as C corporations

1331

09 BURKE SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/13 9:13 AM

attributable to legislation expanding the number and type of permissible
shareholders.17 In addition, S corporations have an advantage in structuring
employee-shareholder compensation because paying dividends in lieu of
salary may avoid payroll taxes.18 Regardless of their level of participation, S
shareholders are thus on a par with limited partners who are permitted to
exclude their distributive share of partnership income from net selfemployment income.19 By contrast, general partners are subject to selfemployment tax on their distributive share of partnership income (with
exceptions for specified types of income) on the theory that such partners are
often actively engaged in the partnership’s trade or business.20 In the case of
LLCs, it is unclear whether members should be treated as analogous to
limited or general partners for employment tax purposes.21
The emergence of private equity firms, typically organized as
partnerships, has attracted widespread attention because of their favorable
compensation arrangements and the seeming porousness of the publicly
traded boundary. The so-called “Blackstone bill” would classify as a
corporation any publicly traded partnership that derives income from asset
management or investment advisory services.22 The proposed legislation is a
rifle-shot response to an aggressive planning technique, involving the use of
“blocker corporations” interposed between an active business and a publicly
traded entity to convert “bad” (nonqualifying) income into “good”
(qualifying) income for purposes of the passive income exception under §
7704.23 While this use of blockers was viewed as undermining the existing

declined from 17% to 6%. See also MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42726, THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM: OVERVIEW AND OPTIONS FOR
REFORM 7–8 (2012).
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A) (100 shareholder limit), (b)(3) (qualified Subchapter S
subsidiary), (c)(1) (family members treated as a single shareholder), and (c)(6) (certain tax-exempt
organizations).
18. S shareholders are required to include “reasonable compensation” in their FICA tax base but
are not subject to self-employment tax. See David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008
(8th Cir. 2012); Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S—Just Do It, 62 TAX LAW.
749, 807 (2009) (suggesting that avoiding payroll tax “is a primary, perhaps the, primary force
behind the use of S corporations”).
19. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(13). The limited-partner exclusion is outmoded because state law
generally no longer prevents limited partners from actively participating in the partnership’s
business. See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND
REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 97–99 (2005).
20. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1), (2), (3), (10).
21. See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 137 (2011) (LLP partners
not treated as limited partners). In 1997, Treasury proposed regulations that attempt to distinguish
between active and inactive passthrough participants, but Congress imposed a moratorium on
enforcement of the regulations. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402-2(a) (1997).
22. See e.g., J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-62-07, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX
TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART I 49–50 (2007).
23. See Taylor, supra note 12, at 1 (describing a blocker (or stopper) as an entity whose
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publicly traded line, the larger issue is whether the line itself is properly
drawn.24
Even though the passthrough sector includes many “small” businesses,
large partnerships and S corporations account for a substantial portion of
total assets and total receipts. In 2009, partnerships with $100 million or
more in assets constituted only 0.6% of all partnerships but held 72% of all
partnership assets; S corporations with $100 million or more in assets
constituted only 0.08% of all S corporations but held 36% of all S
corporation assets.25 Total receipts are also disproportionately concentrated
in a small number of large partnerships and S corporations. While
approximately 0.2% of partnerships reported gross receipts in excess of $50
million in 2009, they accounted for 67% of total partnership receipts; the
0.3% of S corporations with total receipts in excess of $50 million accounted
for 35% of total S corporation receipts.26 By any standard, the upper
echelons of partnerships and S corporations comprise very large firms. Yet
such entities escape the two-level corporate tax.27
Passthrough income is disproportionately concentrated among highincome individuals. In 2006, taxpayers with adjusted gross income above
$250,000 received 62% of all passthrough income.28 If taxes rise on net
passthrough income, high-income individuals would bear the brunt of the tax
increase. Assuming corporate tax cuts are financed by allowing the top two
individual rate brackets to revert to pre-2001 levels, the increase in the
individual tax rate is estimated to affect only about 3% of small businesses.29
insertion into a structure is intended to change the underlying character of the income (or assets) or
otherwise achieve a tax result that would be unavailable without the use of multiple entities); see
also id. (suggesting that use of the entity classification rules for this purpose may be immune from
challenge under the economic substance doctrine).
24. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 142 (2009); id. at 143
(noting that “future companies may not need public tradability if mechanisms emerge to create
investor liquidity without it”).
25. See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-66-12, SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO CHOICE OF BUSINESS
ENTITIES 11 (2012).
26. See id. at 11–12.
27. See Martin A. Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large Passthroughs as Corporations, 131 TAX NOTES
1015, 1017 (2011) [hereinafter Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large Passthroughs] (criticizing the lack of a
level playing field).
28. See MARK P. KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43259, WHO EARNS PASS-THROUGH
BUSINESS INCOME? AN ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA 3 (2012) [hereinafter
Keightley, ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA]
29. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41392, SMALL BUSINESS AND THE
EXPIRATION OF THE 2001 TAX RATE REDUCTIONS: ECONOMIC ISSUES 6 (2010). The American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 effectively repeals the top two brackets but only for roughly the upper
1% of taxpayers. Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102(b)(1), 126 Stat. 2313 (2013) [hereinafter ATRA]
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A large portion of all passthrough income would be affected, however,
because ownership of large passthroughs is concentrated among highbracket individuals.30 If corporate tax cuts are financed by reducing business
tax preferences, passthroughs would be adversely affected, since most tax
preference items used by corporations are also used extensively by
passthroughs.31 Although the bulk of income earned by partnerships and S
corporations is active income, these entities also report significant amounts
of passive income—25% of total income for partnerships and 10% for S
corporations, respectively.32 Beginning in 2013, such income is potentially
subject to the 3.8% Medicare tax on unearned income.33 Passthroughs also
account for a surprisingly high percentage of net long-term capital gains;
between 1997 and 2007, the percentage of such gains attributable to
passthroughs increased from 30.1% to 44.4%.34 Passthrough owners thus
stand to lose significantly if the capital gain rate is increased.35
While lower corporate tax rates appeal to business managers,36
corporate-shareholder integration has little political support. In 2003, the
Bush administration initially proposed a version of the 1992 Treasury
integration proposals that would have permitted exclusion of dividends at
the shareholder level, but only if such dividends were paid from previously
taxed corporate income.37 Instead, Congress enacted a 15% rate for
qualified dividend income regardless of whether such amounts were
previously taxed at the corporate level.38 Simultaneously, in the guise of
providing additional shareholder level relief, Congress reduced the rate on

(modifying § 1(h)(1)(C) (15% rate) and adding new § 1(h)(1)(D) (20% rate)).
30. See Martin A. Sullivan, Should We Raise Tax Rates on Wealthy Employers?, 132 TAX
NOTES 979, 980 (2011).
31. See Small Businesses and Tax Reform: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement of Robert Carroll)
[hereinafter Statement of Robert Carroll] (indicating that, between 2011 and 2015, passthroughs
account for 22% of projected annual business tax expenditures totaling roughly $100 billion).
32. See Keightley, ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL TAX RETURN DATA, supra note 28, at 6.
33. See I.R.C. § 1411.
34. See Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Capital Gains: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Way & Means and the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Leonard E. Burman).
The growth of private equity funds and other investment partnerships may help to explain this shift.
35. If the 2003 tax cuts had been allowed to expire, the rates for capital gains and dividends
would have increased to 23.8% and 43.4%, respectively. Instead, the ATRA maintains the 15% rate
on capital gains and dividends for all but the highest earners, who now face a 23.8% rate. See supra
note 29.
36. See Daniel Halperin, Mitigating the Potential Inequity of Reducing Corporate Tax Rates,
126 TAX NOTES 641, 646 (2010). European countries have also moved away from integration, while
significantly lowering corporate tax rates and broadening the corporate tax base. Id.
37. See generally Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken”?, 28 VA. TAX REV.
341, 347–53 (2008); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders and the Corporate Double Tax, 95
VA. L. REV. 517 (2009).
38. Burke, supra note 37, at 350.
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capital gains regardless of whether such gains were derived from retained
earnings.39 Thus, Congress created an unstable situation in which a
temporary dividend tax cut potentially encouraged dividend payouts in
anticipation of a future increase in the dividend tax rate.40 Reducing
corporate tax rates would undermine the rationale for the 2003 tax cuts as a
way of mitigating the double level tax burden on corporate earnings. By
contrast, increasing the rate on dividends and capital gains could help to
finance lower corporate rates and improve progressivity.41
III. SHELTERING WITHIN CORPORATIONS
If corporate tax rates fall and individual tax rates rise, C corporations
could again become attractive as tax shelters, reversing the
“disincorporation” phenomenon that followed the 1986 Act. While such a
“reincorporation” strategy may appear counterintuitive, its attractiveness
would depend on the disparity between the maximum individual and
corporate tax rates and the ability to defer (or avoid) the shareholder level
tax on distributed corporate income.42 Reducing the combined corporateshareholder tax burden could also impair the overall level of progressivity.43
Increasing taxes on net passthrough income could have the opposite effect,
since such income is concentrated among high-bracket individuals and the
tax burden may not be easily shifted. Nevertheless, passthrough owners can
be expected to press to keep rates low for noncorporate net business income,
while resisting any effort to shift the cost of corporate tax reform to the
passthrough sector.
While it might be possible, in theory, to limit corporate rate reductions
to publicly traded entities for which concerns about international
competitiveness are most plausible, such an outcome seems politically

39. Id.
40. See Stephen A. Bank, Dividends and Tax Policy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533,
573. Although the ATRA averted decoupling of the tax rates for dividends and capital gains, it
remains to be seen how stable the compromise will prove. See supra note 35.
41. See generally Rosanne Altshuler et al., Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a
Global Economy, TAX POL’Y CENTER, May 12, 2010 (arguing that restoring the pre-1997 rates on
capital gains and dividends would enhance progressivity and permit a reduction in the corporate tax
rate from 35% to 26%).
42. Passthrough taxation would remain attractive to allow losses and tax-preferred income to
pass through.
43. See Gravelle & Hungerford, supra note 14, at 428–33 (discussing recent empirical work on
the incidence of the corporate tax). See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34229, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2012).
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unrealistic. A more likely outcome would be reduced tax rates for all C
corporations, including closely held corporations. Permitting closely held
corporations to benefit from reduced rates would greatly magnify the tax
shelter problem. Under current law, there is generally no reason for a new
business to elect corporate form except to exploit the low rate brackets for
the first $75,000 of corporate income.44 If corporate rates are significantly
reduced, eliminating the low rate brackets should be given serious
attention.45 Graduated rates are not needed to provide a special benefit to
small businesses, which can elect Subchapter S status or be taxed as a
partnership by default. Moreover, many small businesses may be owned by
high-income individuals who would otherwise be taxed at the maximum
individual rate. A more far-reaching proposal would be to limit Subchapter
C to publicly traded corporations and their subsidiaries, reducing the need
for anti-abuse provisions.46
If corporate tax rates are cut, the preferential rate should not be extended
to business income generally.47 The justification for preferential treatment
of all business income is that the corporate tax functions essentially as a tax
on capital income, and hence lower rates should logically apply to
noncorporate net business income as well.48 The drive to reduce corporate
tax rates, however, is based on the need to improve international
competitiveness, not the desirability of reducing taxes on capital income
generally. Nevertheless, corporate tax reform may falter politically because
of well-organized opposition from the passthrough sector. The main
concern is that the passthrough sector would be harmed by eliminating tax
preferences to finance corporate tax reform, since passthroughs would lose
the preferences but would not benefit from the lower corporate rate.49
44. See I.R.C. § 11(b).
45. See generally Steven A. Bank, Taxing Bigness, TAX L. REV (forthcoming 2013) (tracing the
history of the graduated corporate tax rate); Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Repeal of Graduated Corporate
Tax Rates, 131 TAX NOTES 1395 (2011); cf. John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the
Business Tax Entities Universe: “Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do,” 78 TEX L.
REV. 885, 978 (2000) (“In fact, lobbyists for small private C corporations fight fiercely and
effectively for the preservation and expansion of the inside shelter from lower graduated
rates . . . .”).
46. See George K. Yin, Corporate Tax Reform, Finally, After 100 Years, in TOWARD TAX
REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 114, 115 (Tax Analysts ed.
2009).
47. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 50–51 (2007)
(proposing carving out business income of passthrough entities for a “special reduced business tax
rate as part of the individual income tax”; the special rate would be set equal to the maximum
corporate rate).
48. See Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 Nw. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 41, 42 (2010).
49. See Statement of Robert Carroll, supra note 31, at 7 (warning of the “potential for
undesirable side effects”); MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: TAXING PROFITS IN
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Enthusiasm for cutting corporate tax rates may well splinter over the issue of
which (if any) preferences should be reduced or eliminated.50
Even if corporate tax rates are cut, corporate earnings would still be
subject to a shareholder level tax when distributed. Taxing distributions
could help to minimize revenue losses from lower corporate rates and
prevent erosion of the individual income tax base. For example, assume that
the maximum individual rate is increased to 40%, the maximum corporate
rate is reduced to 25%, and a “distribution tax” of 20% is levied on all
corporate distributions to individual shareholders. If a corporation earns
$100 and pays $25 tax, a distribution of the after-tax amount ($75) would
attract a distribution tax of $15 at the shareholder level, yielding a combined
corporate-shareholder tax burden of 40% equal to the maximum individual
rate.51 The combination of the two taxes yields the same aggregate burden
as taxing income only once at the shareholder’s rate. The “split-rate”
approach is attractive because it could accommodate a range of corporate
and distribution tax rates.52 The lower the corporate tax rate, however, the
higher the distribution tax rate that would be needed to achieve the desired
combined tax burden.53 As a practical matter, a high distribution tax rate
(and low corporate tax rate) would greatly exacerbate tax planning aimed at
deferring or avoiding the second level of tax, while enhancing the benefit of
reinvesting retained earnings within the corporation.
To ensure a uniform tax burden on distributed corporate earnings,
capital gains and dividends should be taxed at the same rate. If the capital

THE 21ST CENTURY 109

(2011) (“One of the most difficult political hurdles for corporate tax reform
is its potentially negative effect on pass-through businesses.”).
50. See Jane G. Gravelle, Practical Tax Reform for a More Efficient Income Tax, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 389, 402–03 (2010) (even eliminating nearly all business tax expenditures would only allow
the corporate tax rate to be reduced by a few percentage points); Heather M. Rothman, As Details
Emerge, Business Community Could Split on Tax Reform, Practitioner Says, 172 DAILY TAX REP.,
Sept. 6, 2012, at G-2.
51. The shareholder would be left with $60, the same amount that would be available after tax if
passthrough income of $100 were taxed at a 40% rate. To equate the burden on distributed corporate
income and passthrough income, the distribution rate (d) would need to be set equal to (pc)/(1c)
where p is the shareholder’s marginal tax bracket and c is the corporate tax. See Halperin, supra
note 36, at 645 n.23.
52. For example, it would be possible to maintain roughly the pre-2013 burden on distributed
corporate earnings (44.75%) by setting the corporate and distribution tax rate both at 25%. See id. at
644 n.16. The shareholder would owe a tax of $18.75 on $75 distribution ($100$125 corporate
tax), resulting in a combined burden of 43.75%. Under the ATRA, the combined burden is roughly
50.5%, assuming dividends are taxed at 23.8%. See supra note 29.
53. To maintain a 44.75% combined corporate-shareholder burden, a 15% corporate tax rate
would require a distribution tax rate of 35%. The shareholder would owe a tax of $29.75 on the $85
distribution ($100$115 corporate tax), resulting in a combined burden of 44.75%.
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gain rate is lower than the dividend rate, shareholders have an incentive to
withdraw earnings in nondividend transactions. Given the current parity of
the capital gain and dividend rates, the distinction between dividend and
nondividend distributions often matters only for purposes of basis recovery.
If the rate parity proves permanent, it may be possible to eliminate
provisions designed to police the boundary between dividend and
nondividend distributions.54 Basis recovery continues to be important,
however, if a shareholder has a high basis. If stock is held until death, the §
1014 basis step-up affords an easy escape from the distribution tax with
respect to a shareholder’s share of undistributed corporate earnings and
unrealized appreciation in corporate assets.55 Taxing distributions uniformly
would require reducing the death time basis step-up and denying the full
charitable deduction for contributions of appreciated corporate stock.56 Such
reforms may be politically unrealistic, however, and would reintroduce the
vexing problem of allocating income under a passthrough model.
Taxing distributions would not eliminate the fundamental problem of
sheltering within the corporation—namely, the ability to retain earnings and
achieve a higher after-tax return on the reinvested earnings whenever the
corporate rate is lower than the individual rate.57 Immediate distribution of
corporate earnings accelerates the shareholder level tax, while retention
defers the tax. If investments inside the corporation earn the same after-tax
return as investments outside the corporation, however, there is generally no
advantage to deferral of the tax.58 Deferring distributions is advantageous,
however, if the return on retained corporate earnings is taxed at a lower rate
than the return on amounts invested outside the corporation. While there is
no advantage to deferring the distribution tax on the initial corporate
earnings, the ability to earn a higher after-tax return on retained corporate
earnings represents a permanent benefit that increases the longer amounts
remain invested within the corporation.59 In the extreme case, if the
corporate rate were set to zero, all corporations would essentially function as
“special tax-free savings accounts.”60 Reinvested corporate earnings would
grow tax-free and the accumulated return would be reduced only by the
distribution tax.

54. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 302(b) (redemptions treated as exchanges).
55. I.R.C. § 1014.
56. See Halperin, supra note 36, at 654.
57. See id. at 646.
58. The cost of an immediate dividend distribution is equal to the discounted present value of
the tax that would otherwise be due if earnings were retained and distributed as a dividend in the
future. See generally Daniel Halperin, 2009 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture Before the American College
of Tax Counsel: Rethinking the Advantage of Tax Deferral, 62 TAX LAW 535 (2009).
59. See Halperin, supra note 36, at 647–48.
60. SHAVIRO, supra note 24, at xiii.
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Under passthrough treatment, undistributed net business income would
be taxed currently at the owner’s tax rate. If the same business were
incorporated, the profits and any accumulated earnings would be taxed
currently only at the lower corporate rate, subject to a potential future
distribution tax. As under pre-1986 law, high-income individuals would
have a strong incentive to use corporations as tax shelters, exploiting higher
corporate after-tax returns while deferring the distribution tax. Corporations
could once again serve as incorporated pocketbooks for passive investments,
heightening the significance of corporate “penalty” taxes.61
Lower corporate tax rates would also encourage shareholder-owners to
disguise compensation as dividends. In the case of C corporations, the
concept of “reasonable compensation” has focused mainly on the potential
for excessive compensation.62 By contrast, undercompensation is apparently
rampant in S corporations where owners have an incentive to avoid
employment taxes by paying themselves minimal compensation and passing
through the S corporation’s residual earnings as noncompensation income.63
Significant revenue could be raised by extending the compensation rules for
general partners to all members of passthrough entities—including LLCs,
LLPs, and S corporations—who materially participate in the business.64
Treating all active passthrough owners alike for compensation purposes
would curtail the use of S corporations to reduce employment taxes.
If corporate tax rates are reduced, it would also be desirable to
harmonize the employment tax treatment of shareholders of S corporations
and privately held C corporations.65 In the close corporation context,
61. See I.R.C. §§ 531–37 (accumulated earnings tax), §§ 541–47 (personal holding company
tax). A more radical approach would be to tax all passive income earned through corporations at the
maximum individual rate, though this approach could be viewed as penalizing investment in
corporate form. See Halperin, supra note 36, at 653.
62. Under current law, personal service corporations are already taxed at the maximum
individual rate. See I.R.C. §§ 448(d)(2), 11(b)(2).
63. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-195, TAX GAP: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ADDRESS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH S CORPORATION TAX RULES 25 (2009) (estimating that, in 2003
and 2004, S shareholders underreported compensation by roughly $23.6 billion).
64. See PRESIDENT’S ECON. RECOVERY ADVISORY BD., THE REPORT ON TAX OPTIONS:
SIMPLIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND CORPORATE TAXATION 67 (2010). Certain types of income,
such as interest and rental income, would continue to be excluded from self-employment income.
Cf. Schwidetzky, supra note 18, at 793–94 (arguing that the material participation standard is overly
broad as applied to nonservice partnerships).
65. See Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
127, 149–50 (2009). The number of owners dramatically affects the incentive to mischaracterize
labor income as capital income. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Pub. No. 4168, THE TAXATION OF
CAPITAL AND LABOR THROUGH THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAX 14 (2012); see also Nicholas Bull &
Paul Burnham, Taxation of Capital and Labor: The Diverse Landscape by Entity Type, 61 NAT’L
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disguising salary as dividends avoids payroll taxes and defers shareholder
level tax until such amounts are distributed. Reducing corporate tax rates
significantly below the maximum individual rate would clearly exacerbate
the failure of existing law to adequately police mistaxation of labor income.
Using corporations to shelter labor income would not only reduce the
individual income tax base but also erode the long-term solvency of the
Social Security and Medicare trust funds.66
IV. PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS AND ENTITY CLASSIFICATION
If integration of corporate-shareholder taxes is impractical or
unattainable, mitigating the disparity between large passthroughs and
corporations may be worth exploring.
Consistent with this goal,
policymakers have expressed interest in taxing large passthroughs as
corporations.67 These proposals reflect concern over the long-term decline
in corporate tax revenues and the related rise of the passthrough sector.68
The difference in tax treatment of otherwise identical firms based solely on
their legal structure may also be perceived as inequitable. Taxing large
passthroughs as corporations could help to finance lower tax rates by
broadening the corporate tax base.69 In turn, lower rates would mitigate the
existing distortions under the two-level corporate tax. The continued
expansion of publicly traded partnerships and the growth of private equity
suggest a need to rethink the public-trading line that demarcates corporate
and noncorporate entities.70
Critics claim that the large partnership proposal would reverse a
consistent trend toward liberalizing access to passthrough taxation and

TAX J. 397, 400–01 (2008); id. at 418 (estimating that the gap in reported labor income of business
owners, not including C corporations with more than 75 shareholders, was $153.4 billion in 2002).
66. Cf. Willard B. Taylor, Payroll Taxes—Why Should We Care? What Should Be Done?, 137
TAX NOTES 983, 996 (2012) (recommending integration of payroll taxes and individual taxes).
67. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 10 (suggesting the need for “greater parity” in the
treatment of large corporate and noncorporate entities).
68. While corporate taxes accounted for nearly 30% of total federal taxes in 1953, they fell to
less than 9% of total federal taxes in 2010. See KEIGHTLEY & SHERLOCK, supra note 16, at 11; Jane
G. Gravelle, The Corporate Tax: Where Has It Been and Where Is It Going?, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 903,
903–04 (2004); see also CBO, TAXING BUSINESSES, supra note 2, at 15–19 (discussing implications
of shift to passthroughs on federal tax revenues); Martin A. Sullivan, Passthroughs Shrink the
Corporate Tax by $140 Billion, 130 TAX NOTES 987 (2011).
69. Although the number of passthrough entities affected would likely be small, the proposal
could potentially raise significant revenue because of the size of the affected firms. See MARK P.
KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42451, TAXING LARGE PASS-THROUGHS AS
CORPORATIONS: HOW MANY FIRMS WOULD BE AFFECTED? 2 (2012).
70. See Hearing Before S. Fin. Comm. on the Taxation of Business Entities, 112th Cong. (2012)
(statement of Alvin C. Warren). Of the nearly 100 publicly traded partnerships, most are
concentrated in investment banking and energy-related industries. See Sullivan, Why Not Tax Large
Passthroughs, supra note 27, at 1016.
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would move further away from the integration ideal.71 These objections may
miss the mark, however. Expansion of passthrough taxation is attributable
largely to self-help integration, the rise of limited-liability entities, and
lobbying on behalf of S corporations and other passthrough entities. The
enthusiasm for passthroughs also ignores notorious tax shelters—such as
ACM, Castle Harbour, and Son-of-BOSS transactions—that manipulated the
partnership rules to drain revenue from the corporate and individual tax
bases.72 Although Congress has repeatedly sought to reform Subchapter K,
well-meaning attempts to target particular abuses have often added
complexity without deterring tax-motivated transactions. Moreover, limiting
the choice to double-level taxation or passthrough taxation poses a false
dichotomy and ignores the realistic alternative of a single tax imposed
exclusively at the entity level.73
In the wake of the 1986 Act, exempting certain publicly traded
partnerships from § 7704 might have seemed reasonable, given the
perceived shortcomings of the two-level tax system. If the alternative is a
single tax imposed at the entity level, however, it is not clear that
passthrough treatment continues to be warranted. An entity level tax offers a
more efficient and administrable approach that could improve compliance;
taxes would be collected from a limited number of entities rather than from a
much larger number of individual taxpayers. In the late 1990s, the ALI
project on classification and streamlining of private business organizations
considered but ultimately rejected an entity level approach, while
acknowledging that the “choice between conduit and entity taxation is a very
close one.”74 Other commentators have concluded that complex private
business enterprises should be subject to a single entity level tax when
income is earned.75 These proposals were all premised on the notion that the

71. See Philip F. Postlewaite, Raising Revenue Through Misguided Classification Reform, 136
TAX NOTES 1177, 1180, 1187 (2012).
72. ACM Partnership v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); TIFD III–E, Inc. v. United
States, 666 F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Castle Harbour”). See generally Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M. P. McCouch, COBRA Strikes Back: Anatomy of a Tax Shelter, 62 TAX LAW. 59, 64 (2008).
73. See George K. Yin, Publicly Traded Partnerships, Closely Held Corporations and Entity
Classification for Tax Purposes, 88 TAXES 329, 329 (2010).
74. George K. Yin & David J. Shakow, Reforming and Simplifying the Income Taxation of
Private Business Enterprises, in 3 J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-3-01, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION 220, 229 (2001).
75. See generally Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51 TAX
LAW. 229 (1998); Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future
Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 249 (1999).
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task of ascertaining the partners’ economic arrangement under Subchapter K
in its current form is excessively burdensome.
Subchapter K was never intended to accommodate interests that are
widely held and frequently traded. While Congress in 1997 enacted
simplified reporting rules and a special audit regime for “electing large
partnerships” with more than 100 partners, few partnerships make the
election.76 Under current proposals, the large partnership audit rules would
be mandatory for partnerships with more than 1,000 partners, but the
simplified reporting rules would remain elective.77 Although the mandatory
large partnership audit rules might mitigate existing inefficiencies, they
would probably do little to overcome the perception that IRS auditors are
often reluctant to audit partnerships and are limited in their ability to identify
relevant technical issues.
Very few widely held partnerships comply fully with the requirements
of Subchapter K.78 Often these partnerships ignore technical compliance and
resort to creative tax allocations to ensure fungibility of interests. Some
commentators assert that technical noncompliance does not necessarily pose
a problem for the tax system, reasoning that the managers of widely held
partnerships are seldom familiar with the tax profiles of particular investors
and hence have little incentive to engage in strategic tax allocations to take
advantage of disparities in tax characteristics.79 Unfortunately, such selfserving claims are unverifiable because these entities routinely escape
audit.80 More importantly, there are grounds for concern that certain types of
partnerships operate under special rules outside the normal framework of
Subchapter K.
For example, securities partnerships are permitted to take advantage of
special aggregation rules to comply with the requirements of § 704(c) with
respect to allocations of built-in gain or loss.81 The exception to the § 704(c)
rules is justified on the theory that, given the need for frequent revaluations
and the large number of assets involved, asset-by-asset allocation would be
unduly burdensome. Recent tax bar proposals would expand the class of
securities partnerships eligible to use special aggregation methods.82 In

76. See I.R.C. § 775(a)(1); Eric B. Sloan & Matthew W. Lay, Beyond the Master Limited
Partnership: A Comprehensive Review of Publicly Traded Partnerships, 88 TAXES 229, 295 (2010).
77. See J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-2-12, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN
THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL 622 (2012).
78. See Yin, supra note 73, at 330–31.
79. See id. at 331, 334 n.25.
80. See Amy S. Elliott, Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs Escape the IRS,
136 TAX NOTES 351 (2012).
81. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3) (2012).
82. See generally NYSBA TAX SECTION, AGGREGATION ISSUES FACING SECURITIES
PARTNERSHIPS UNDER SUBCHAPTER K (2010).
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addition, such partnerships would be permitted to adjust basis under §§
734(b) and 743(b) on an aggregate (rather than asset-by-asset) basis
following certain distributions and transfers of interests.83 Like the special
aggregation rules for § 704(c), the exception to the basis adjustment rules is
defended on the ground that compliance would be unduly burdensome.84
Under current law, securities partnerships routinely employ so-called
“stuffing allocations” to circumvent the basis adjustment rules. Stuffing
allocations (also referred to as “fill-up” or “fill-down” allocations) specially
allocate taxable gain or loss to a withdrawing partner equal to that partner’s
share of unrealized gain or loss in the partnership’s assets.85 The special
allocation does not change the amount of gain (or loss) recognized by the
withdrawing partner but may change the character of such gain (or loss).86
By shifting taxable gain away from the other partners, the special allocation
effectively allows them to deduct a portion of the purchase price of the
redeemed partner’s interest. If challenged, it seems highly unlikely that such
allocations would be respected as satisfying the substantial economic effect
test under the § 704(b) regulations. Rather than sanctioning a de facto twotrack partnership regime to facilitate fungibility of actively traded
partnership interests, it may be worthwhile to consider imposing an entity
level tax on publicly traded partnerships and certain securities partnerships.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1986 Act reforms were politically feasible largely because they
shifted a substantial portion of the individual tax burden to the corporate
sector. In contrast, current proposals for reducing corporate tax rates would
in effect shift a portion of the corporate tax burden back to individuals.
While simply lowering the corporate tax would clearly be regressive, such a
reform could enhance overall progressivity if coupled with higher tax rates
on dividends and capital gains. A combined corporate-shareholder tax
burden at least equal to the maximum individual rate would be essential to
prevent corporations from reemerging as tax shelters and thereby eroding the
personal income tax base. As a result of self-help integration and the

83. See id. at 16.
84. See id. at 28.
85. See id. at 35–36. Because the stuffing allocation equalizes the distributee’s outside basis and
the amount of cash distributed, the distribution does not trigger gain recognition under § 731(a); as
result, no basis adjustment is required under § 734(b).
86. See David S. Miller & Jean Bertrand, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Hedge Funds, Their
Investors, and Their Managers, 65 TAX LAW. 309, 334 (2012).
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proliferation of passthrough entities—each with its own powerful business
constituency—the corporate tax has become essentially a tax on public
trading. Comprehensive reform should reconsider the boundaries between
public and private business firms as well as the feasibility of a single entity
level tax for entities that cannot easily comply with a passthrough regime.
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